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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the middle 1960s, promisors increasingly have sought judicial relief
from burdensome contracts.I Rising rates of inflation and OPEC price hikes
have contributed significantly to this trend. The cases sometimes have in-
volved long-term contracts with either fixed price terms2 orescalating price
1. See, e.g., United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966);
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974);
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.
Ct. 1974); cases cited notes 2 & 3 infra.
2. See, e.g., Portland Section of the Council of Jewish Women v. Sisters of
Charity, 266 Or. 448, 451, 513 P.2d 1183, 1185 (1973).
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terms that failed to reflect increases in the promisor's costs accurately.3
Although several doctrines are potentially applicable, the courts generally
have analyzed these cases on the basis of commercial impracticability, 4 and
almost without exception, they have refused to grant any relief when the
promisor's sole complaint has been increased cost of performance. 5
Traditional contract doctrine holds promisors strictly liable for breach
of their contractual duties. 6 The courts, however, have developed several
doctrines that allow a promisor to escape that liability when his contract
becomes burdensome. Among those doctrines are commercial impracticabil-
ity, frustration of purpose, and mutual mistake of fact. The courts, for many
reasons, historically have limited the availability of these doctrines to very
narrow circumstances. In the past few decades, there has been some move-
ment toward expanding the availability of these doctrines, but that move-
ment has been slow, and the courts have been very reluctant to grant prom-
isors relief. One reason for this reluctance is the difficult of framing a
satisfactory remedy. The normal remedy for commercial impracticability,
frustration of purpose, and mutual mistake of fact is to excuse or release the
promisor from further performance. 7 Sometimes, however, this result would
place a heavy burden on the promisee. In those instances, the courts are
naturally reluctant to disturb the general rule of strict liability. 8
In 1980, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, in Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, Inc. ,9 expan-
sively used all three doctrines to grant a promisor relief from a burdensome
3. See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light &Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129,
137 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'don other grounds, 603 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1979); Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 432-33 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. 989, 990 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 17, 1975); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d
721, 723 (Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
4. See, e.g., cases cited notes 1-3 supra.
5. See cases cited notes 1-3 supra. A few courts have excused the promisor on
the basis of increased costs under the doctrine of commercial impracticability, but
those cases also have involved a change in the contemplated mode of performance.
Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 513 P.2d 76, 80-82 (Alaska 1974); City
of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 2d 710, 717-21, 290 P.2d 841, 845-48
(1955); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 292-93, 156 P. 458,
459-60 (1916). See notes 74-83 and accompanying text infra.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 11, Introductory
Note, at 309 (1981).
7. See notes 141-50 and accompanying text infra.
8. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 79 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial
Frustration of the U. C. C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 203, 228-29 (1979); notes 169-72 and accompanying text infta.
9. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
[Vol. 47
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long-term contract. In so doing, it rejected several traditional barriers to
relief that the courts have used to prevent promisors from satisfying the
requirements of the doctrines of commercial impracticability, frustration
of purpose, and mutual mistake of fact. The court also granted a new
remedy-price adjustment-instead of confining itself to the normal "com-
plete excuse or complete enforcement" choice.
This Comment discusses the doctrines of commercial impracticability,
frustration of purpose, and mutual mistake of fact, and their application to
disputes involving long-term contracts that have become burdensome
because of increased cost of performance. It examines the differences among
the three doctrines and points out some of the advantages and disadvantages
of each. It closely examines the Aluminum Company ofAmerica (Alcoa) case and
explains the court's uniquely flexible use of these doctrines. The Alcoa court
is the first to apply all three theories to a dispute involving a burdensome
long-term contract, and in several instances, it has extended these doctrines
beyond precedent. Finally, this Comment discusses the Alcoa court's use of
the price adjustment remedy as a method to arrive at a solution that is "fair"
to both the promisor and promisee.
II. ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA V. ESSEX GROUP, INC.
A. A Typical Dispute
The facts of Alcoa present a textbook example of a dispute involving a
long-term contract that has become burdensome because of increased cost
of performance. In 1966, Essex Group, Inc. (Essex) decided to manufac-
ture a new line of aluminum wire products. In late 1967, the firm entered
into a contract with the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) to secure
a long-term source of aluminum to meet its expanding needs. The contract's
terms required Essex to deliver specified amounts of alumina10 (raw material)
to Alcoa for conversion into aluminum. After Alcoa had completed the con-
version process, Essex was required to pick up the aluminum. The agree-
ment was to last until 1983, but Essex had the option to extend it until 1988.
The price term was subject to an escalation formula, but the maximum cost
to Essex was set at 65 % of the market price of aluminum as published in
a trade journal.11
For several years, Alcoa and Essex performed without incident under
the contract. Thereafter, the price formula failed to work as the parties ex-
pected, and Alcoa began to sustain heavy losses. The formula, in part, called
for price adjustments as Alcoa's nonlabor production cost changed. The price
10. The contract was held not to be for the sale of goods. Id. at 84. Thus, the
Uniform Commercial Code did not apply to this case. It was, however, used for
guidance by the court. Id. at 73-74.
11. The particulars of the formula are set out in the opinion. Id. at 58. Essex
had bargained expressly for the maximum price term. Id. at 68.
19821
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was to reflect such changes "in direct proportion to periodic changes in the
Wholesale Price Index-Industrial Commodities (WPI-IC). "12 The price
formula, however, was rendered inaccurate, i.e., a greater disparity
developed between Alcoa's actual cost and the price as set by the formula
than the parties expected, when the price of electricity, one of Alcoa's prin-
cipal production costs, rose much faster than did the WPI-IC. During 1977
and 1978, Alcoa lost a total of $12,000,000 on the contract; in 1979, Alcoa
predicted additional out-of-pocket losses of more than $75,000,000 if it per-
formed for the remainder of the contract.
In 1979, Alcoa sued Essex in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania requesting, on a number of theories,1 3 the
court to "reform or equitably adjust' x the contract by changing the price
formula so that it would reflect Alcoa's actual nonlabor production cost. Essex
counterclaimed for damages and asked the court to specifically enforce the
contract for its remaining term.
B. An Atypical Analysis- The Court's Application of the Commercial
Impracticability, Frustration of Purpose, and Mutual Mistake of Fact
Doctrines to One Dispute
The Alcoa court, construing Indiana law, held for Alcoa and modified
the price term of the contract.15 The court first analyzed the dispute in terms
of the mutual mistake of fact doctrine.1 6 It characterized the use of an inac-
curate price formula as a mutual mistake of fact justifying relief. Speculating
that the chance for review was high, however, the court thought it appropriate
to rule on the commercial impracticability and frustration of purpose doc-
trines as well. It held that those doctrines also justified relief for Alcoa.1 7
While, as the court noted, I" all three theories are similar, there are im-
portant differences among them. Commercial impracticability generally deals
12. Id. at 58.
13. Alcoa sought this remedy on five grounds: (1) mutual mistake of fact, (2)
unilateral mistake of fact, (3) unconscionability, (4) frustration of purpose, and (5)
commercial impracticability. In a second count, Alcoa alleged that the contract had
been modified by oral agreement and that Essex had breached the new agreement.
In a third count, Alcoa alleged that it should be excused from performance accord-
ing to the terms of a side letter agreement. Alcoa lost on both of these issues. Id.
at 80-85.
14. Id. at 55.
15. Id. at 57. Alcoa did not receive the full relief it requested. The price was
not modified to reflect its full actual production cost. See notes 157-59 and accom-
panying text infra.
16. 499 F. Supp. at 61-70.
17. Id. at 70.
18. The court stated:
In broad outline the doctrines of impracticability and of frustration
of purpose resemble the doctrine of mistake. All three doctrines discharge
[Vol. 47
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 24
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/24
1982] RELIEF FROM LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 83
with supervening events that impede performance; 19 frustration of purpose
generally deals with supervening events that make the exchange worthless
to one of the parties;20 mutual mistake of fact deals with beliefs that are not
in accord with the facts at the time the contract was made. 21 Commercial
impracticability and frustration of purpose decisions often turn on questions
concerning the risk of supervening events; 22 mutual mistake of fact decisions
look to the risk of beliefs not in accord with the facts. 23 Commercial imprac-
ticability and frustration of purpose focus on severe hardship as the basis
for relief, while mutual mistake of fact focuses on an upset in the equivalence
of the bargain. 24 Finally, while a finding of commercial impracticability or
frustration of purpose justifies excuse from the duty to perform, 25 a finding
of mistake of fact merely renders the contract voidable. 26
III. DISCUSSION OF THE DOCTRINES
A. Commercial Impracticability
The doctrine of commercial impracticability is an exception to the tradi-
tional contract notion that promisors are strictly liable for breach of their
contractual duties.27 In the 1600s, the English courts said that the promisor
never was excused from his duty to perform. 28 By the mid-1800s, English
an obligor from his duty to perform a contract where a failure of a basic
assumption of the parties produces a grave failure of the equivalent of value
of the exchange to the parties. And all three are qualified by the same no-
tions of risk assumption and allocation.
Id.
19. See U.C.C. § 2-615; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261
(1981). The new Restatement also has a section dealing with existing impracticabil-
ity. Id. § 266(1). This section offers the possibility of substantial overlap with the
doctrine of mutual mistake. See notes 105 & 112-14 and accompanying text infra.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981). Id. § 266(2) pro-
vides relief for existing frustration. See note 105 infra.
21. See notes 108-14 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 58-73 & 93-95 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 120-33 and accompanying text infra.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 6, Introductory
Note (1981); notes 74-83, 96 & 134-40 and accompanying text infra.
25. U.C.C. § 2-615; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5261 (1981).
26. Contracts entered into under a mutual mistake of fact are considered
voidable at the option of the adversely affected party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS 5 152 (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 502 (1932).
Mistakes that prevent the formation of a contract sometimes render the apparent
contract void. Id. § 501. See also Fulton v. Bailey, 413 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Mo. 1967).
27. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
28. See, e.g., Paradinev.Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647); Hurst, Freedom of Con-
tract in an Unstable Economy:Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under U. C. C. Section
2-615, 54 N.C. L. REV. 545, 549-50 (1976); Wallach, supra note 8, at 204.
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and American courts would excuse the promisor from liability if he could
establish that performance had become literally impossible. 29 In 1916, the
California Supreme Court extended the doctrine30 by holding that perform-
ance did not have to be impossible, but merely impracticable, i.e., it could
"only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost."' 31 Today, American
courts recognize that literal impossibility is not a condition to excuse from
performance, 32 but traditions of strict liability in contract have fostered a
reluctance to excuse performance merely because it has become
impracticable.3 3 The Uniform Commercial Code drafters sought to reduce
this judicial caution when they drafted Uniform Commercial Code section
2-615. 3 - The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, in section 261, has followed
their lead. 35 Both attempts have had little substantive impact on the imprac-
ticability doctrine. The Alcoa court, however, embraced the goals of the Code
29. See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 313-15 (1863); Hurst,
supra note 28, at 549-51; Wallach, supra note 8, at 204-05.
30. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
31. Id. at 293, 156 P. at 460.
32. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d
283, 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d
312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583
S.W.2d 721,725-28 (Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). See U.C.C.
§ 2-615; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
33. See Hurst, supra note 28, at 574; Wallach, supra note 8, at 206-07, 218-21;
Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U. C. C. Section 2-615from
the Common Law, 72 NW. L. REv. 1032, 1044-45 (1978).
34. See Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 79 COM. L.J. 75, 77 (1974); Hurst, supra note 28, at 554; Wallach, supra note
8, at 203; Comment, supra note 33, at 1035.
U.C.C. § 2-615 provides:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and
subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller
who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occur-
rence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made ....
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) provides:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made im-
practicable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
The language is very similar to that in U.C.C. § 2-615. See note 34 supra. The com-
ments to § 261 frequently state that § 2-615 was used for guidance in drafting §
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, Comments a, b, d (1981).
6
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and Second Restatement drafters, and its views provide an alternative to
the prevailing strict approach to impracticability problems.
If the parties to a contract have allocated the risk of impracticability of
performance, the express terms of the contract control. 36 In the typical situa-
tion, however, the parties have not formally allocated this risk. 37 Even if the
risk has not been allocated expressly by the parties, the promisor will still
be held liable for nonperformance unless his performance is excused under
the doctrine of commercial impracticability. 3 To invoke this doctrine, a
promisor must prove that there has been an unexpected event or contingency,
usually a supervening event, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made. 39 He also must prove that the
event made performance impracticable 4 and that the impracticability is not
his fault. 41
In order for the commercial impracticability doctrine to apply, a
supervening event or contingency must render performance under the con-
36. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 599-600 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 8; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, Comment c (1981).
37. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-9, at
129-30 (2d ed. 1980). This discussion does not observe the subtle distinction bet-
ween the concepts of assumption of risk and allocation of risk. See notes 68 & 120-22
and accompanying text infra.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 11, Introductory
Note (1981); id. § 261, Comment a.
39. This general scheme of analysis tracks the U.C.C. and the new Restate-
ment. See notes 34 & 35 supra. The courts analyze the impracticability question in
the same or similar manner. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United
States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody
Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 725-26 (Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865
(1979). See also Comment, supra note 33, at 1042-44.
40. See note 39 supra.
41. Although not stated expressly in U.C.C. § 2-615, if the impracticability
is the fault of the promisee, he will not be excused. The landmark case on fault is
Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 199, 179
N.E. 383, 384 (1932). See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499
F. Supp: 53, 73 n. 15 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (burden on promisee to prove promisor was
at fault); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 132-33
& n.6 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (court discusses burden of proof and fault), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 429, 440-41 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (costs increased by intra-company pro-
fits); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981); 6 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1329 (1962). One commentator has stated that the "cases show that the
faultlessness requirement can be a significant barrier to the successful assertion of
the excuse defense." Wallach, supra note 8, at 212. This is especially true since
"every case will involve some type of fault." Id. at 219.
7
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tract impracticable. Many times, this element of commercial impracticability
is obvious and presents no problem. Sometimes, a global event, such as the
Arab oil embargo, can be blamed for the promisor's troubles. There are
times, however, when no specific event can be identified. 42 In those instances,
a characterization is required. 43 For example, the Alcoa court found that "the
non-occurrence of an extreme deviation of the WPI-IC and Alcoa's non-
labor production costs was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made.' 44 In other words, the inaccuracy of the price formula index itself
was characterized as the supervening event or contingency that caused
Alcoa's losses. 45 This initial characterization is important not only because
42. For example, in some cases several events or contingencies will combine
to increase costs. In others, such as Alcoa, a party can pick one of several aspects
of one overall event. For example, Alcoa argued that the inaccurate formula was
the event creating its losses. It could have characterized rising electricity costs as
the triggering event, or it could have gone one step further and characterized the
Arab oil embargo as the triggering event. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex
Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 58-59 (W.D. Pa. 1980); note 45 infra.
In cases where one of several events or contingencies can be characterized as
the triggering event, the promisor's advocate should pick the event that seems most
unforeseeable and most outside the scope of risks assumed or allocable to the pro-
misor. See notes 47-73 and accompanying text infra. See also note 45 infra.
43. See note 42 supra.
44. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 72
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
45. In its mistake analysis, the Alcoa court characterized the use of the inac-
curate price formula as a mistake relating to an existing fact, i. e., a present actuarial
error. Id. at 61-63. Under present mistake doctrine, that characterization was
necessary because relief can be granted for mistake only if the mistake relates to
a fact existing when the contract was made. See notes 108-14 and accompanying
text infta. In its impracticability analysis, the court could have characterized Alcoa's
losses as being caused by an existing impracticability rather than a superven-
ing impracticability. The former justifies relief under RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 266(1) (1981) or RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 456 (1932).
See note 105 infra. Such a characterization would have been consistent with the
court's mistake analysis. The court, however, characterized the deviation as the
contingency that rendered performance impracticable. This deviation did not ex-
ist when the contract was made, and thus the court's characterizations are incon-
sistent. The court, however, implied that the distinction between existing fact and
future event was not the main issue in the case and that the doctrines were better
understood to rest on risk allocation principles. See 499 F. Supp. at 70-72. In fact,
the court expressly rejected the existing fact requirement in the mistake doctrine.
Id. at 71. The court, perhaps realizing that the Alcoa situation could be'characterized
in a number of ways, stated, "Thus there is a substantial area of similarity between
the three doctrines. Within that area, the findings and holdings with respect to the
claim of mistake also apply to the claims of impracticability and frustration." Id.
at 72.
Another interesting feature of the Alcoa case is the court's characterization of
8
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it triggers the application of the impracticability doctrine, but also because
the bulk of the impracticability analysis turns on the event that caused the
promisor's loss.
46
Once the triggering event is identified, the promisor must establish that
its nonoccurrence was a basic assumption 47 on which the contract was made.
This element of the impracticability doctrine is complex. A finding that the
nonoccurrence of a particular event was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made does not depend on whether the parties consciously
thought about the event at the time the contract was made. 48 The courts,
although their exact method of analysis is unclear, consider factors such as
foreseeability of the event or contingency, assumption of risk, and alloca-
tion of risk as important in determining the basic assumptions of the parties.
49
the contingency involved as being the deviation between the WPI-IC and Alcoa's
actual costs. Other courts, faced with similar questions involving price formulas,
have focused either on the actual events causing the cost increases involved or on
the cost increases themselves. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., 415
F. Supp. 429, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (energy crisis foreseeable); Publicker Indus.
Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. 989, 992 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 17, 1975)
(cost increases foreseeable). The Alcoa court's characterization makes possible an
argument that the foreseeability of the cost increases is irrelevant and that the courts
should look at the foreseeability of the deviation instead. See Missouri Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 865 (1979); notes 50-57 and accompanying text infra. It is not clear,
however, that the Alcoa court noticed this possible argument. See 499 F. Supp. at
58, 74-76.
46. See notes 42 & 45 supra.
47. For a discussion of the meaning of the "basic assumption" term, see note
115 infra. The term probably originated when courts granted excuse for imprac-
ticability on the ground that there was an implied term in the contract authorizing
excuse. Thus, the courts talked about the parties' basic assumptions and thoughts
at the time they entered into the contract. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard,
172 Cal. 289, 292-93, 156 P. 458, 459-60 (1916). The implied condition theory has
been rejected, but the "basic assumption" term remains. See United States v.
Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1966) ("basic assumption"
term is "a somewhat complicated way of putting Professor Corbin's question of
how much risk the promisor assumed"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, Chapter 11, Introductory Note (1981); id. § 261, Comment b; 6 A. COR-
BIN, supra note 41, § 1331.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 11, Introductory
Note (1981).
49. The courts do not always express these three concepts as simply factors
used to decide what the basic assumptions of the parties were. The new Restatement,
however, states that they are important factors in deciding the basic assumption
element. Id.; id. 5 261, Comment b. On the other hand, both U.C.C. § 2-615 and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981), Comment c suggest that
the assumption/allocation of risk questions should receive separate treatment. Where
9
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Foreseeability can be a troublesome barrier to relief. 50 Despite authority to
the contrary,51 most courts hold the promisor to the contract if they find that
the contingency was reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made.5 2
It is often said that foreseeable risks are assumed by the promisor unless he
shifts those risks to the promisee via the contract,5 3 and the courts often have
strained to find foreseeability. 54 The Alcoa court held that the deviation bet-
ween Alcoa's nonlabor costs and the WPI-IC was unforeseeable. 55 It found
that while there was some range of foreseeable deviation, "the risk of a wide
variation between these values was unforeseeable in the commercial sense.' '56
The court also rejected the strict approach on the foreseeability factor and
adopted the view that foreseeability alone does not preclude relief.57
Intertwined with the foreseeability factor is the concept of assumption
of risk.5 8 If it is found that a promisor assumed the risk of the occurrence
these concepts are pigeonholed in the analytical scheme of impracticability is dif-
ficult to ascertain, but it seems best to speak of them as factors relating to the "basic
assumption" term.
50. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America V. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 75-76 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp.
429, 438, 441-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Hurst, supra note 28, at 567-70; Duesenberg,
Exiting From Bad Bargains Via U. C. C. Section 2-615. An Impractical Dream, 13 U.C.C.
L.J. 32, 36-38 (1980); Wallach, supra note 8, at 214-15, 218-20.
51. See notes 52 & 57 infra.
52. The courts often state that foreseeability of the supervening event caus-
ing impracticability is not an absolute bar to relief. A finding that the event was
reasonably foreseeable, however, usually results in a holding that the promisor
assumed the risk of the event because he did not protect himself in the contract.
See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134-35
(N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Lloyd
v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54-56, 153 P.2d 47, 50-51 (1944); Missouri Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 725-28 (Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 865 (1979); Hurst, supra note 28, at 567-70; Wallach, supra note 8, at
214-15, 218-21; Comment, supra note 33, at 1037-42.
53. See note 52 supra.
54. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 215.
55. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 58
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id. The court rejected the rule that all foreseeable risks should be allocated
to the promisor. The new Restatement says that foreseeability is merely a factor
in determining whether the risk should be allocated to the promisor. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 261, Comments b, c (1981). U.C.C. § 2-615 makes
no mention of foreseeability, but Comment I to that section mentions "unforeseen
supervening circumstances." See Transatlantic Financing Co. v. United States, 363
F.2d 312, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (foreseeability not dispositive); Hurst, supra note
28, at 567-70.
58. See notes 52 & 57 supra.
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that caused the hardship, relief will be denied. 59 Such a finding may be based
on the promisor's express assumption of the risk, 60 on circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the contract, 61 or on the presumption that certain
risks normally are assumed by the promisor, unless shifted by the contract. 62
Past impracticability decisions have taken the position that the promisor nor-
mally assumes the risk of an inaccurate price formula. 63 The Alcoa court re-
jected this view64 and distinguished decisions to the contrary on the ground
59. U.C.C. § 2-615; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, Com-
ments b, c (1981). See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 74-76 (W.D. Pa. 1980); cases cited notes 1-3 supra; 6 A. CORBIN, supra note
41, § 1328.
60. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
61. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318-19
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (foreseeability indicates willingness to assume some abnormal
risk); Heat Exchangers v. Map Constr. Corp., 34 Md. App. 679, ,368 A.2d
1088, 1094-95 (1977) (failure to shift foreseeable risk in contract permits conclu-
sion that risk assumed by promisor); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,
583 S.W.2d 721, 726 (Mo. App., W.D.) (court lists a number of relevant factors),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 8; RESTATEMENT(SE-
COND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, Comment c (1981); 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, §
1328; Hurst, supra note 28, at 570-73; Wallach, supra note 8, at 214-15. See generally
cases cited notes 1-3 supra.
62. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 261, Comments b, c (1981).
63. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134-37
(N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'don other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 437-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker
Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. 989,990-93 (E.D. Pa.Jan.
17, 1975); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728
(Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). See also McLouth Steel Corp.
v.Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 570 F.2d 594, 609 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801
(1978). The use of a ceiling or maximum price term alongwith aformulais especially
damaging to the promisor. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.,
499 F. Supp. 53, 79-80 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. at 992; Duesenberg, supra note 50, at 41; notes 126-28 and
accompanying text infra.
A special problem arises when the parties agree on a nonexistent index or an
index whose character changes after the contract is formed. See North Cent. Airlines
v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582, 587-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (court remanded
and ordered insertion of reasonable price term); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 437-42 (change in character of formula index not ground
for excuse); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Earl, 17 Wash. App. 830, 835-39, 565 P.2d
1215, 1218-20 (1977) (court refused to grant relief on mistake theory).
64. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 74
(W.D. Pa. 1980). Alcoa was held to have assumed the risk of some of the cost in-
creases because the contract had a maximum price term. See notes 157-59 and ac-
companying text infra; note 63 supra.
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that they involved different degrees of foreseeability and loss. 65
When the risk of impracticability is not allocated in the contract or
otherwise assumed by one of the parties, the court must determine who
should bear the risk.6 6 Commercial custom and policy dictate the result.
6 7
Although the distinction is not always clear, this court-imposed allocation
of risk differs from the concept of assumption of risk in that it requires a more
objective inquiry. 68 The present view is that the promisor should be allocated
most of the risks associated with his performance. 69 This general rule is said
to promote certainty and stability in commercial transactions. 70 In all the
commercial impracticability decisions involving inaccurate price formulas,
the risk of burdensome performance was allocated to the promisor. 71 While
the Alcoa court did not discuss many of the factors that other courts have
stressed, it did not allocate this risk to the promisor.7 2 The parties' efforts
to limit their risks were the central reason for this finding.
7 3
Once the promisor has established that an event has occurred, the nonoc-
currence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made,
65. 499 F. Supp. at 74, 76.
66. See U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS 5 261, Commentsb, c (1981); 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, at § 1321, 1328.
67. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53,
76 (W.D. Pa. 1980); authorities cited note 66 supra. In Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court stated, "The
doctrine [of impracticability] ultimately represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by
courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the com-
munity's interest in having contracts enforced according to their terms is outweighed
by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance." (Footnote omitted).
For an extensive work on risk allocation principles, see generally Posner & Rosen-
field, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977). See notes 183 & 184 and accompanying text infra.
68. See notes 121 & 122 and accompanying text infra.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 11, Introductory
Note (1981); id. at Chapter 6, Introductory Note, at 380, which states, "Indeed,
in the absence of provision to the contrary and aside from the exceptional cases of
supervening impracticability (§ 261) and frustration (§ 265), a party generally bears
the entire risk of subsequent changes that affect the agreed exchange." See Hurst,
supra note 28, at 574-75.
70. "It makes little difference to the community which party must bear the
risk, but it makes much difference that we may know in advance which one must
bear it." 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 1328. See Hurst, supra note 28, at 574-75 (also
noting importance of freedom of contract notions); Wallach, supra note 8, at 218
(other policies noted).
71. See cases cited note 63 supra.
72. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73-76
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
73. Id. See also notes 123-29 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 47
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he must show that the event has rendered performance impracticable. 74 When
increased cost of performance constitutes the promisor's sole ground for
claiming impracticability, the courts require a strong showing of severe
hardship. 75 While no exact standard exists, relief has been denied when a
100 % cost increase was involved.7 6 A 1000 % cost increase, however, has
been held sufficient to support a finding of impracticability. 77 The promisor
cannot rely solely on evidence indicating large increases in cost because some
courts strictly have considered only those increases attributable to certain
causes. 78 Those courts have required the promisor to prove that the cost in-
74. U.C.C. § 2-615; RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 261 (1981).
See notes 27-33 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra. U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment
4, provides:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in
cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature
of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself
ajustification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business
contracts are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or
of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure,
unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply and the like, which either
causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from secur-
ing supplies necessary to his performance is within the contemplation of
this section.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 261, Comment d (1981), states, "A
mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased
wages, price of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the nor-
mal range, does not amount to impracticability ... ." See Hurst, supra note 28,
at 562; Wallach, supra note 8, at 215-18.
76. SeePublicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. 989,
992 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 1975); Wallach, supra note 8, at 215-18.
77. See City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 2d 710, 717-21, 290
P.2d 841, 845-48 (1955); Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 291-93,
156 P. 459, 459-60 (1916); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter
11, Introductory Note (1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 460, Comment
a, Illustration 2 (1932); Wallach, supra note 8, at 215-18.
78. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), where the court
stated:
Where the occurrences complained of are in some degree foreseeable
and capable of being protected against contractually, where the burden-
some production cost increase complained of is to some extent a function
of internal corporate decisions, and where it is impossible to determine what
share of the increase is attributable to unforeseen conditions not assignable
to the party seeking adjustment, it becomes unnecessary to reach the ques-
tion of how much increase constitutes impracticability. In fact failure of
proof stymies any attempt this court could make toward adjustment under
§ 2-615.
13
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creases did not result from promisor fault, market fluctuations, management
decisions, foreseeable events, or other risks assumed by or allocable to the
promisor. 79
The Alcoa court found that Alcoa would lose over $60,000,000 out of
pocket over the life of the contract if it were fully enforced" and considered
that degree of loss sufficient to justify a finding of impracticability. 8' It is
unclear whether the court looked beyond the $60,000,000 figure and con-
sidered the actual percentage of cost increase involved. 82 If the actual figure
approached a mere 100% increase, Alcoa represents major departure from
prior decisions. 83
B. Frustration of Purpose
The frustration of purpose doctrine also represents an exception to the
general rule that a promisor is strictly liable for breach of his contractual
duties. 84 The doctrine originated in England and has gained limited accept-
ance in America. 85 The modern requirements of the doctrine are expressed
in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 265, which provides:
467 F. Supp. at 135. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp.
429, 440-41 (S.D. Fla. 1975). A good scholarly discussion explaining the isolation
of cause concept is in Wallach, supra note 8, at 218-21.
79. See note 78 supra.
80. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73
(W.D. Pa. 1980). The court considered only the increases due to the deviation. It
noted the isolation of causes concept, but did not give it extensive attention. Id.
at 73 n. 15. The court did not require Alcoa to use expert testimony in order to prove
its future losses. See also notes 134-40 and accompanying text infra.
81. 499 F. Supp. at 73.
82. Although the court mentioned other cases that denied excuse because the
percentage of cost increase was too low, the court never indicated what percentage
of cost increase in Alcoa was not reflected by the price formula. Information pro-
vided in the opinion does not provide a basis on which a percentage figure can be
computed.
83. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 215-18. The mistake doctrine does not re-
quire the proponent to prove severe hardship. Its less restrictive requirement pro-
vides an incentive for the promisor to characterize his situation as being within the
scope of the mistake doctrine rather than the commercial impracticability doctrine.
See notes 134-40 and accompanying text infra.
84. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981) (supervening
frustration); id. § 266(a) (existing frustration). U.C.C. § 2-615 apparently also was
drafted broadly enough to encompass the doctrine of frustration. See id., Comment
3; Hawkland, supra note 34, at 76-80. While American courts recognize the doc-
trine, it has seen limited success. See Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A RdectedDoc-
trine, 3 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 1-4 (1953); Hawkland, supra note 34, at 76-80; Com-
ment, Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 98, 98-100 (1960).
14
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Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event
the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his remaining duties to render performances are
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary. 86
The frustration of purpose doctrine is closely akin to the doctrine of com-
mercial impracticability.8 7 There is, however, an important distinction with
regard to the event that triggers its application. Instead of focusing on
supervening events that impede performance, the frustration doctrine focuses
on supervening events that make the exchange worthless to one of the
parties. 8 The 1903 English case of Krell v. Henry89 illustrates this distinc-
tion. In Krell, the promisor rented, for a premium, a room along the route
of the King's coronation parade. His ultimate purpose" for entering the con-
tract was to watch the parade. The King fell ill, however, and the parade
was cancelled. Although the promisor's performance was still possible, i.e.,
he still could have paid the rent, he was excused from performing the con-
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
87. Both doctrines use extreme hardship as a basis for relief and both require
the same "basic assumption" analysis. Id., Comment a. See notes 47-73 and ac-
companying text supra.88. Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 265 (1981); 6 A. CORBIN, supra note
41, § 1353, 1355.
89. [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
90. One of the difficulties with the frustration of purpose doctrine is deter-
mining what kinds of frustrated purposes justify relief. Until Alcoa, the courts had
refused to apply the doctrine when the promisor's purpose to earn money or avoid
loss was frustrated. See notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra. Generally, the
doctrine has been applied when the promisor's reason (aside from profit) for entering
the contract has ceased to exist. For example, in Krell, the promisor's reason for
entering the contract, i.e., to watch the parade, had ceased to exist; thus, the ex-
change was worthless to him. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265
(1981) uses the term "principal purpose" in describing the type of purposes that
fall within the doctrine. Professor Corbin used the term "ultimate object of desire."
6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 1353. Corbin stated:
It may be asked how can a contractor's purpose be frustrated by col-
lateral events, when the agreed equivalent promised him in return for his
own has been performed or is going to be. In such a case he gets that for
which he bargained-his immediate object of desire. The answer to this
is that a contractor has indirect and ultimate objects of desire; he bargains
for the immediate object in order to attain more remote ends and in the
confident belief that the attainment of the first will bring home the second
also.
Id. See Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 82 Wis.
2d 514, 521-23, 263 N.W.2d 189, 192-94 (1978).
1982]
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tract because his purpose for entering the contract had been frustrated. 9'
Aside from this distinction, the frustration and impracticability doctrines
are very much alike. Frustration, like commercial impracticability, applies
the concepts of foreseeability, 92 assumption of risk,93 and allocation of risk94
to determine whether the nonoccurrence of the triggering event was a basic
assumption 95 on which the contract was made. Both doctrines also require
a showing of severe hardship96 before the promisor will be excused from per-
formance and a lack of promisor fault. 97
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 26598 requires that the prom-
isor's principal purpose for making the contract be frustrated before relief
can be granted. Furthermore, courts have been restrictive in the types of
purposes they will consider.99 Promisors have not been excused under
the frustration doctrine when their purpose to earn money or avoid loss is
frustrated. 10 0 This restriction has rendered the frustration doctrine inap-
91. 2 K.B. at 754.
92. E.g., West Los Angeles Inst. for Cancer v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225-26
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1010 (1967); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d
48, 54-56, 153 P.2d 47, 50-51 (1944); Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 474,
482-83 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Chicago &
N. W. Transp. Co., 82 Wis. 2d 514, 526-29, 263 N.W.2d 189, 194-96 (1978);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265, Comment a (1981).
93. E.g., West Los Angeles Inst. for Cancer v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225-26
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1010 (1967); Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank,
495 F. Supp. 815, 819 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v'
Loverde, 70 Cal. 2d 666, 675-78, 451 P.2d 721, 727-28, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889, 895-96
& n.13 (1969); Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477, 482-84 (Mo. App., St. L.
1977); Brenner v. Little Red School House, - N.C. -, -, 274 S.E.2d
206, 209-10 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265, Comment
a (1981).
94. E.g., Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977)
(dictum); Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1283-84 (Utah 1976); 6 A. COR-
BIN, supra note 41, § 1354.
95. E.g., Ma v. Community Bank, 494 F. Supp. 252, 257-58 (E.D. Wis.
1980); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 82 Wis.
2d 514, 526-29, 263 N.W.2d 189, 195-96 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
96. E.g., Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp. 815, 819 (W.D. Pa.
1980); Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477, 483-84 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265, Comment a (1981).
97. E.g., 407 E. 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275,
282, 244 N.E.2d 37, 42, 296 N.Y.S.2d 338, 344-45 (1968); Chicago; M., St. P.
& P. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 82 Wis.2d 514, 524-29,263 N.W.2d
189, 194-96 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
99. See note 90 supra.
100. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 76-78 (W.D. Pa. 1980). When a promisor's purpose to earn money or avoid
[Vol. 47
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plicable to most disputes involving long-term contracts that have become
burdensome due to increased cost of performance. 10 1 The Alcoa court,
however, rejected that restriction and decided that Alcoa's purpose to earn
a profit or avoid a loss could be characterized as a principal purpose within
the meaning of section 265.102
The promisor may have little advantage to gain by applying the frustra-
tion doctrine to disputes involving burdensome long-term contracts.
Characterizing such a dispute as a frustration problem does not appear to
affect the standards for relief since the same basic assumption and severe
hardship requirements must still be satisfied. 10 3 In fact, the Alcoa court ap-
plied its commercial impracticability analysis on the basic assumption and
hardship questions to its frustration analysis without further discussion. 0 4
loss is frustrated, it is usually because it has become more expensive to render per-
formance. In those cases, he should assert the theory of commercial impracticability
as a basis for excuse. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra. See generally 499
F. Supp. at 72-73; Pete Smith Co. v. City of El Dorado, 258 Ark. 862, 863-64, 529
S.W.2d 147, 148-49 (1976); Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App.
2d 302, 314-16, 34 Cal. Rptr. 317, 324-25 (1963); note 90 supra. Perhaps for this
reason, the courts and promisors have not discussed the purpose to earn money
or avoid a loss. The Alcoa court held that such purposes do fall within the scope of
the frustration doctrine, but cited no cases discussing the issue. See note 102 infra.
101. See note 100 supra.
102. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 78
(W.D. Pa. 1980). The court suggested that unfairness would result if relief were
not granted when extreme inflation would otherwise render enforcement of a con-
tract harsh. It noted Professor Corbin's opinion that frustration should apply to
situations in which gross inflation has rendered the performance of a contract mean-
ingless to one of the parties. Id. at 77-78. A fair reading of Corbin's work, however,
indicates that he was speaking of situations far different from the one involved in
Alcoa. See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 1360. While the court did not cite any cases
directly supporting its holding, it did note that past American and foreign decisions
have granted relief in times of serious inflation. The court said:
The exact character of the relief granted is not important here. Neither
is the exact explanation of the decisions found in the cases, because even
the Civil War cases antedate the evolution of the distinct doctrine of frustra-
tion. What is important is this: first, the results of those decisions would
be readily explained today in terms of frustration of purpose. Corbin
discusses them in his chapter on Frustration of Purpose. And second, the
frustration which they involved was a frustration of the purpose to earn
money or to avoid losses. Thus it appears that there is no legitimate doc-
trinal problem which prevents relief for frustration of this sort. There re-
main the customary strictures concerning risk allocation and gravity of in-
jury. Those have been addressed above [in the court's impracticability
analysis] and need not be considered again here.
499 F. Supp. at 78.
103. See notes 92-97 and accompanying text supra.
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C. Mutual Mistake of Fact
The mutual mistake doctrine rarely has been applied to disputes involv-
ing long-term contracts that have become burdensome due to increased cost
of performance. 105 The Alcoa court, however, held that Alcoa was entitled
to "some form of relief"106 because of a mutual mistake of fact. Its analysis
105. The overwhelming majority of commercial impracticability and frustra-
tion of purpose cases have involved supervening events. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266 (1981) also recognizes the doctrines when condi-
tions existing at the time the contract was made render the contract impracticable
or frustrate the purpose of one of the parties. That section provides:
(1) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's performance under it
is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason
to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which
the contract is made, no duty to render that performance arises, unless the
language or circumstances indicate the contrary.
(2) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no reason
to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which
the contract is made, no duty of that party to render performance arises,
unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary.
The Second Restatement comments indicate that many of the same standards apply
to both existing and supervening commercial impracticability and frustration of
purpose. Two differences, however, are specifically noted. First, the party must
have no reason to know of the existing facts. Second, if the doctrine applies, the
promisor is considered never to have had a duty to perform instead of being excused
from performance. Id., Comment a. The drafters also suggest that a party is more
likely to assume the risk of an existing fact than that of a supervening event.
Most of the burdensome long-term contract cases have been decided on the basis
of commercial impracticability, but, since both mistake and existing impracticability
relate to existing facts that affect the value of a party's contract, the mistake doc-
trine probably is applicable to some disputes involving burdensome contracts. In-
deed, the Second Restatement notes that in some situations, both mistake and ex-
isting impracticability or frustration of purpose may apply. Id., Comment c.
The mistake doctrine does not require extreme hardship as does existing or
supervening impracticability or frustration. See notes 134-40 and accompanying text
infra. The Second Restatement, however, implies that courts should be more will-
ing to allocate risks to the promisor when he asserts the mistake doctrine than when
he asserts the latter doctrines. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
Chapter 6, Introductory Note (1981). In view of the courts' past willingness to
allocate risks to the promisor in impracticability and frustration cases, it may not
be valid to distinguish the doctrines on the allocation of risk issue. See notes 49-73
and accompanying text supra.
For an application of mistake doctrine where commercial impracticability also
could have been applied, see National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338
F.2d 99, 106-12 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
106. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
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provides an excellent illustration of the doctrine's potential use.
The court applied Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 152(1),
which states:
Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as
to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is
voidable by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of
the mistake under the rule stated in § 154.107
In order for this section to apply, the court had to decide whether the use
of the inaccurate price formula was a mistake or simply a misjudgment of
future events. Mistakes of existing facts may justify relief, but erroneous
predictions do not.10 8 While noting that the use of the price formula was not
"wholly isolated from predictions of the future,"1 0 9 the court characterized
its use as "essentially a present actuarial error." 1 0 It further said that the
formula's "capacity to work as the parties expected it to work was a matter
of fact, existing at the time they made the contract." I1 This characteriza-
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981). The final draft
of the new Restatement had not been published at the time Alcoa was decided. The
court, however, applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 294 (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1975). 499 F. Supp. at 62. That section contained the same language
as the new § 152. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 5 502 (1932).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981) defines a mistake
as "a belief not in accord with the facts." At the time Alcoa was tried, the new
Restatement had not been published. The court, therefore, applied RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 293 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1975). That section defined
a mistake as "a belief that is not in accord with existing facts." (Emphasis added.)
The court, however, was presented a master draft of the new Restatement § 151
by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth. Professor Farnsworth testified that as the
reporter, he had deleted the .word "existing" from the tentative draft in response
to a "small but unanimous body of opinion that didn't like the word 'existing.'
499 F. Supp. at 62. Professor Farnsworth further testified:
I think there is in the comment still a statement with respect to "existing"
but the deletion from the black letter is at least a change that permits more
flexibility with respect to the line between what is an existing fact or what
is a fact and what is a pure presumption which is an extremely difficult
line to draw in both cases.
Testimony of E. Allan Farnsworth, quoted in 499 F. Supp. at 62-63. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 151, Comment a, at 9 (1981) provides:
Furthermore, the erroneous belief must relate to the facts as they ex-
ist at the time of the making of the contract. A party's prediction orjudg-
ment as to events to occur in the future, even if erroneous, is not a "mis-
take" as that word is defined here.
See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra; notes 109-14 and accompanying text
infra.
109. 499 F. Supp. at 63.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 64.
19821
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tion, seemingly at odds with the court's impracticability analysis,1 1 2 was
essential to the court's mistake analysis.1 1 3 Most courts in similar situations
have indicated that the unsuitable formulas were accurate at the inception
of the contract, but rendered inaccurate by supervening events.1 14
The court also found that Alcoa had satisfied the rather loosely defined
element of mistake that requires that the mistake relate to a basic
assumption' of the parties. To establish this element, the proponent is not
112. See notes 45 & 105 and accompanying text supra.
113. The requirement that the mistake must relate to "existing facts" remains
strong in the law of mistake. See, e.g., Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp.
815, 817-18 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Tony Downs Foods Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d
367, 372-74 (Ct. Cl. 1976);J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. United States, 485 F.2d 588, 596
(Ct. C1. 1973); Bernstein v. Kapneck, 46 Md. App. 231,-, 417 A.2d 456, 461
(1980); Czarnecki v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 524 S.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1975); Rabin, A Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in
Bargain Transactions, 45 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1285-86 (1967).
The line between an existing fact and a prediction into the future can sometimes
be difficult to draw. See, e.g., Haas v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 817-18;
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 339, 86 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1957); notes 42-46 and
accompanying text supra.
114. See cases cited note 3 supra; notes 45 & 105 supra. One court has analyzed
a price formula case under the mutual mistake doctrine. In City of Austin v. Cot-
ten, 509 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1974), the court held that the adversely affected
party had assumed the risk of the mistake because the parties had bargained
on the assumption that the future was uncertain. The court refused to hold "that
a mistaken expectation concerning a future state of facts... [would] never justify
relief." Id.
115. The term "basic assumption" is difficult to define. If the parties conscious-
ly assumed that a certain fact was true, it may be a basic assumption. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, Comment b, Illustrations 1-6 (1981). A con-
scious assumption, however, is not required. Id. Comment b. In Comment b, the
drafters state that the term means the same as it does in the frustration of purpose
and commercial impracticability doctrines. See id. §§ 261, 265. As used there,
whether something was a basic assumption of the parties often turns on questions
of risk allocation, foreseeability, and assumption of the risk. See notes 47-83 and
accompanying text supra. In the new Restatement's mistake section, however, those
concepts are given treatment separate from the basic assumption question.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152, 154 (1981). See also note 49 supra.
Professor Corbin criticized the use of the basic assumption language because
he felt that the main problem is really one of allocating risks "in accordance with
the requirements of 'justice.' " 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 1331, at 358. In view
of the new Restatement's separation of the risk allocation concepts from the basic
assumption element in § 152, it is unclear what the term implies beyond what the
parties actually assumed or what the court thinks they normally would have
assumed. See notes 117-33 and accompanying text infra. For differing views on what
assumptions are required for mistake, see Tombigbee Constructors v. United States,
20
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required to prove that the parties consciously bargained on the existence of
the mistaken fact. 116 Often, the parties may not have considered the fact in
question, but the court still can decide the question on the basis of commercial
practice and usage.117 Mistakes about value ordinarily do not justify relief
because the "parties are conscious of the uncertainty of value." 8 The
Alcoa court, however, stated:
The assumed capacity of the price formula in a long term service
contract to protect against vast windfall profits to one party and vast
windfall losses to the other is so clearly basic to the agreement as to
repel dispute. While the cases often assert that a mistake as to price
or as to market conditions will not justify relief, this is not because
price assumptions are not basic to the contracts. Instead, relief is
denied because the parties allocated the risk of present price uncer-
tainties or of uncertain future market value by their contract.' 9
Although the Second Restatement and the Alcoa court apparently analyze
the assumption/allocation of risk questions as a separate element of mistake,
those questions also relate to the mistake doctrine's basic assumption
analysis. 2 The distinction between assumption of risk and allocation of risk
420 F.2d 1037, 1041 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Guthrie v. Times-Mirror Co., 51 Cal. App.
3d 879, 887-88, 127 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582-83 (1975); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich.
332, 345-46, 86 N.W.2d 537, 543 (1957); Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. Kehlor, 155
Mo. 643, 653-57, 56 S.W. 287, 289-91 (1900); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422,
430, 215 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1975); 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1544 (3d ed.
1970); Rabin, supra note 113, at 1286-88.
116. See note 115 supra.
117. See note 115 supra; notes 121-25 and accompanying text infra.
118. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 605, at 638-39 (1960).
119. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 65
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
120. Id. The Alcoa court followed the new Restatement's lead and treated the
"basic assumption" element and the risk allocation question as separate inquiries.
That separation, however, may not be justified historically. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 41, § 598 (1960); J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 128 (2d rev. ed. 1974); notes
47 & 115 supra.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 9 152 (1981) bars relief if the adversely
affected party to the contract bears the risk of the mistake under § 154. Id. § 154
provides:
A party bears the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but
treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is
reasonable in the circumstances to do so.
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is, again, subtle, but generally the latter relates to court-imposed risk alloca-
tion on the basis of commercial practice and policy, 121 whereas the former
generally is based on the circumstances surrounding the contract. 122 The
Alcoa court found that Alcoa did not bear the risk of the inaccurate price
formula. 123 Essex argued that Alcoa had expressly or impliedly assumed the
risk of the mistake because it failed to protect itself with a contract term124
and also because "the parties made a calculated gamble with full awareness
that the future was uncertain."1 25 The court rejected both arguments.
Essex's first argument was grounded on its contention that it had in-
sisted on a ceiling price in order to protect itself from the risk of uncertain-
ty and that Alcoa "could have sought a corresponding 'floor' provision to
limit its risks." 126 Despite this classic assumption of the risk argument, 127
the court stated that the circumstances indicated that Alcoa had "plainly"
sought to limit its risk.128 The court rejected Essex's "calculated gamble"
121. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 67-68
(W.D. Pa. 1980); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 154(c) (1981); id.,
Comment d; 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 598 (1960); Rabin, supra note 113, at
1295-97. See Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 166 N.J. Super. 442, 446-47,
400 A.2d 78, 80 (Super. Ct. 1979).
122. The courts sometimes use these terms interchangeably. Assumption of the
risk is usually used, however, to express the judicial process whereby a party is held
to bear the risk because of language in the contract, the circumstances surround-
ing the particular contract, or certain actions or inactions of the party. See Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 67-68 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981); id., Comment c; 3 A.
CORBIN, supra note 41, § 598 (1960); Rabin, supra note 113, at 1292-95; notes 124-29
and accompanying text infra. See also 6 A. CORBIN, supra, § 1328 (1962).
123. Aluminum Co. ofAmericav. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 66-70
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
124. Id. at 68.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For cases that have considered this or similar arguments concerning
assumption of the risk by failure to protect oneself by contractual provision, see
Tony Downs Foods Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 367, 374 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Na-
tional Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 109 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965). In such cases, the courts often state that the party ex-
pressly or impliedly assumed the risk in the contract, or, alternatively, they will
state that the risk was allocated by the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 154, Comment b (1981).
The easiest cases for the courts are those in which they can find a basis for holding
that the adversely affected party expressly assumed the risk of mistake. See Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1062 (1978); Flippin Materials Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 408, 415-16
(Ct. Cl. 1963); City of Austin v. Cotten, 509 S.W.2d 554, 557-58 (Tex. 1974).
128. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 68-69
(W.D. Pa. 1980). The court considered Alcoa's aggressive efforts to limit its risks
[Vol. 47
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argument on the same ground.1 29
Courts that have decided price formula cases on the basis of commer-
cial impracticability have placed the risk of an inaccurate formula on the
party seeking relief.130 The allocation/assumption of risk questions in com-
mercial impracticability cases, however, focus on the risk of supervening
occurrences that impede performance, 131 while the mistake doctrine em-
phasizes the risk of a "belief not in accord with the facts." 132 It is unclear
whether the application of the mistake doctrine provides more lenient stan-
dards on the allocation/assumption of risk questions than does the doctrine
of commerical impracticability.1 3 3
Alcoa also established the last requirement for relief under the mistake
doctrine, that the mistake had a "material effect on the agreed exchange
of performances." 134 This element generally is established by a showing that
the mistake upset the equivalence of the bargain.135 Alcoa was able to show
to be inconsistent with Essex's argument. The court stated that the risk was so im-
probable that "the absence of an express floor limitation can only be understood
to imply that the parties deemed the risk too remote and their meaning too clear
to trifle with additional negotiation and drafting." Id. at 69.
129. Id. at 70. Essex's argument was essentially that the parties had entered
into the agreement in "conscious ignorance" of the facts, i.e., whether the price
formula would work as they had hoped. Id. at 69. The cases and the new Restate-
ment are in agreement that a finding of conscious ignorance will result in the
adversely affected party being held to have assumed the risk of mistake. See, e.g.,
Southern Nat'l Bank v. Crateo, Inc., 458 F.2d 688, 693 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Idlewild Pharmacy, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 19, 25 (E.D. Va. 1969); Guthrie
v. Times-Mirror Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 879, 885, 124 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581 (1971);
Gardner v. Meiling, 280 Or. 665, 674-76, 572 P.2d 1012, 1017-18 (1977); Harvey
v. Robey, 211 Va. 234, 238-39, 176 S.E.2d 673, 675-76 (1970); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981).
130. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
131. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 9 154 (1981).
133. See note 105 supra. The Alcoa court treated the two concepts in the same
fashion. Alcoa's attempt to limit its risk was the most important factor leading the
court to decide that Alcoa had not assumed and could not be allocated the relevant
risks. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 67-71,
74-76 (W.D. Pa. 1980). Under the new Restatement, risk allocation is much
"broader" and "plays a much more significant role in connection with the law of
mistake than it does in connection with the law of impracticability and frustration."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 6, Introductory Note, at 380
(1981). See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 598 (1960); 6 A. CORBIN, supra,
§ 1328 (1962); J. MURRAY, supra note 120, §§ 128, 197.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981).
135. The drafters state:
Ordinarily he will be able to do this [show the material effect] by showing
that the exchange is not only less desirable to him but is also more advan-
tageous to the other party .... In such cases the materiality of the effect
1982]
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that its losses were matched by comparable gains for Essex, and Essex ap-
parently conceded that Alcoa had met this general test for materiality. 13 6
Essex argued that Alcoa had failed to establish that enforcement of the con-
tract would be unconscionable. That requirement, however, exists only when
a unilateral mistake is involved. 137 A showing of severe hardship is not re-
quired to obtain relief for mutual mistake. 138 Commercial impracticability,
as previously noted, requires a showing of severe hardship, and proving losses
sufficient to justify relief has been a difficult task. 139 These differing stan-
dards offer the party seeking relief a strong incentive to bring himself within
the scope of the mutual mistake doctrine. 140
IV. EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT
The usual remedy for mutual mistakes of fact is avoidance or
on the agreed exchange will be determined by the overall impact on both
parties. In exceptional cases the adversely affected party may be able to
show that the effect on the agreed exchange has been material simply on
the ground that the exchange has become less desirable for him, even
though there has been no effect on the other party. Cases of hardship that
result in no advantage to the other party are, however, ordinarily ap-
propriately left to the rules on impracticability and frustration.
Id., Comment c: The Alcoa court found an imbalance in the bargain that justified
relief. Essex argued that a showing of unconscionability was required and that Alcoa
should not be granted relief because it had made a $9,000,000 profit on the con-
tract at the time of suit and it had not used expert testimony to prove its future losses.
The court held that Alcoa's losses were proven sufficiently and that those losses were
offset by comparable gains to Essex. The court also said that even if the future losses
had not been proved, it would have found the mutual mistake material because
Alcoa has received less profit up to the time of suit than it had expected. Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 65-66 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See
note 137 and accompanying text infra. See generally Flippin Materials Co. v. United
States, 312 F.2d 408, 416 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Guthrie v. Times-Mirror Co., 51 Cal.
App. 3d 879, 886-87, 124 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582 (1975); Rabin, supra note 113, at
1288-91.
136. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 65
(W.D. Pa. 1980). See note 135 supra.
137. The courts apply more stringent requirements when the mistake is
unilateral. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 64 (W.D. Pa. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
The Alcoa court, however, rejected Essex's argument that the mistake was unilateral.
499 F. Supp. at 64-65. The court also said that, if necessary, it would have held
that enforcement of the contract would have been unconscionable. Id. at 66. See
note 135 supra.
138. See note 135 supra.
139. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 74-83 and accompanying text supra.
24
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rescission. 141 If the contract is fully or partially performed, the court may
attempt to return the parties to their original positions by granting restitu-
tion or reliance damages. 14 2 The usual remedy for both commercial imprac-
ticability and frustration of purpose is excuse from further performance. 143
As in mistake, restitution or reliance damages may be granted in proper
circumstances. 144 Under all three theories, significant problems can arise
when restitution or reliance damages will not suffice to return the parties
to their original positions. 145 For example, when a party builds a manufac-
turing plant that depends on a cheap source of aluminum in order to be pro-
fitable, the manufacturer may end up bearing a heavy loss, notwithstand-
ing the availability of these remedies. 146 A few courts have split the losses
between the parties after the contract was fully performed, 147 but these deci-
sions have not gained much support. 148 Until Alcoa, however, no court, under
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981); id., Introductory
Note; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 510 (1932). See note 26 and accompany-
ing text supra.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152(2), 158 & Comment a,
294(2), 300(1) (1981). Seegenerally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 15-43 (1937).
143. See notes 34 & 35 supra; note 87 and accompanying text supra.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(1) (1981); id. § 292(1),
Comment b; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 468 (1932). The U.C.C. does not
expressly provide for restitution. The remedy, however, probably is available. See
U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 6; id. § 1-103. For a discussion of restitution as a remedy
for commercial impracticability, see Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United
States, 363 F.2d 312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1966); J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CON-
TRACTS § 13-17 (2d Ed. 1977); Comment, ApportioningLoss AfterDischarge of a Burden-
some Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L. J. 1054, 1060-69 (1960). Reliance
damages also are allowed in some cases. Id. See also Perillo, Restitution in a Contrac-
tual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208 (1973).
145. If the contract is avoided or performance is excused after one of the par-
ties has spent considerable amounts of money in an attempt to perform, he will suffer
a loss unless he has received a benefit equal to his costs from the other party. See
Comment, supra note 144, at 1061-69. Restitution or reliance damages probably
will be inadequate to protect a party who has spent money for capital improvements
in reliance on an assured long-term source of supply if the supply is either unavail-
ble elsewhere or prohibitively expensive at the time performance is excused. See,
e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 79 (W.D.
Pa. 1980).
146. See note 145 supra.
147. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 109-12 (Ct.
Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); Northern Corp. v. Chugach
Elec. Ass'n, 518 P.2d 76, 82-85 (Alaska), modified on rehearing, 523 P.2d 1243,
1243-47 (Alaska 1974). See articles cited note 148 infra.
148. For articles criticizing this approach, see Government Contracts: Fixed-Price
Agreements and Mutual Mistake of Fact, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 542, 546-47 (1965);
Contracts-Implied Warranty; Reformation-No Implied Warranty in Absence of Reliance;
Government Held Liable for One-Half Loss Incurred by "Fixed-Price" Contractor, 33 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 507, 513 (1965).
25
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any of these theories, had ever adjusted the price and anticipated further
performance of the contract. 149 The court granted Alcoa its request for
equitable adjustment and modified the contract's price term so that the ex-
ecutory portion of the contract could be performed. 
150
Although previously untried, 1 5 1 equitable adjustment is available under
the Uniform Commercial Code1 5 2 and the Second Restatement. 153 Both of
149. See generally Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967
WIS. L. REV. 833, 836-37; Wallach, supra note 8, at 228-29. See also notes 151-53
and accompanying text infra.
150. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 78-80
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
151. A few courts have discussed equitable adjustment, but the Alcoa court was
the first to grant it. See McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 570 F.2d
594, 610 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Iowa Elec. Light & Power
Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 135-36, 138-40 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'don
other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 432 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. 989, 990 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 1975).
152. Authority for equitable adjustment in commercial impracticability situa-
tions is granted in U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 6, which provides:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer
when the issue is posed in flat terms of"excuse" or "no excuse, "adjust-
ment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially
the sections on good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on the reading
of all provisions in light of their purposes, and the general policy of this
Act to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and
good faith.
See 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, § 1333, at 371-72 & n.84;J. MURRAY, supra note
120, 5 203; Speidel, Court Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long- Term Supply Contracts,
76 Nw. L. REV. 369, 404-22 (1981); Wallach, supra note 8, at 228-29; Comment,
Commercial Impracticability and Intent in UCC Section 2-615: A Reconciliation, 9 CONN.
L. REV. 266, 273-77 (1977); Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: International
Economic Contingencies and Contractual Excuse Under Section 2-615 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 277, 287 n.46 (1979); cases cited note 151 supra.
Thus far, the courts have held that promisees have no good faith obligation to
negotiate privately with promisors whose performance arguably has become im-
practicable or to accept an upward adjustment of price on request of the promisor.
See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Mo.
App., W.D.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); Speidel, supra, at 370-81; Note,
U. C. C. § 2-615: Sharp Infiationay Increases in Cost as Excuse From Performance of Con-
tract, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 297, 306-08 (1974).
153. The new Restatement provides that the court can supply a reasonable term
to adjust the rights of the parties when the normal remedies for mistake, commer-
cial impracticability, and frustration of purpose will not prevent injustice. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 158(2), 172, 204 (1981). See Hurst, supra note
28, at 555 n.53; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
26
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these sources suggest that the adjustment remedy is available when the nor-
mal " 'excuse' or 'no excuse' ,,154 outcome is insufficient to avoid
injustice.1 5 5 The Alcoa court applied the remedy for that very reason and
stated, "A remedy modifying the price term of the contract in light of cir-
cumstances which upset the price formula will better preserve the purposes
and expectations of the parties than any other remedy. Such a remedy is
essential to avoid injustice in this case." 156 The court decided that rescis-
sion would be unfair to Essex because it would deprive Essex of both an
assured source of supply and certain economic benefits it had gained under
the original price term.1 5 7 Although Alcoa was not allocated the entire risk
of the disparity between its actual cost and the price as computed under the
formula, the court decided that Alcoa had assumed the risk of increased costs
in excess of the maximum ceiling price on which the parties originally had
agreed. 158 Accordingly, the court modified the price at that general level. 15 9
Equitable adjustment of contract terms as basic as price raises several
questions. The first is whether the courts should ever adjust such basic
terms.160Judicial imposition of a price term to which the parties did not agree
conflicts with the maxim that a court will not make a contract for the
parties. 161 This maxim has lost most of its force, but it still represents the
Classical, Neoclassical, andRelational Contract Law, 72 Nw. L. REV. 854,873-76 (1978);
note 161 infra.
154. U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 6. See note 153 supra.
155. See notes 152 & 153 supra.
156. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 79
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 79-80. See note 63 supra.
159. The maximum price Alcoa will receive under the adjusted contract is the
contract ceiling price. If its actual cost does not reach that level, Alcoa is to receive
the greater of either the amount it would receive under the original contract or a
profit of one cent per pound of aluminum converted. 499 F. Supp. at 80.
160. Equitable adjustment allows the court to split losses caused by unexpected
facts or events. Some writers have suggested those losses should be split evenly. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 144, at 1060. Many writers have discussed loss splitting
in relation to situations in which the contract has been performed fully, but adjust-
ment that splits future loss raises similar questions. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra
note 67, at 113-14; Wallach, supra note 8, at 228; Comment, supra, at 1060. Several
writers have complained that an equal division of losses creates uncertainty and
encourages the parties to forego protecting themselves against the risks incident to
their bargains. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra, at 113-14; 65 COLUM. L. REv., supra
note 148, at 546-47; note 161 and accompanying text infra.
161. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 91
(W.D. Pa. 1980). As the Alcoa court noted, the courts can and do make contracts
for the parties. Id. In an effort to avoid the appearance of making contracts, the
courts analyzed impracticability in terms of an implied term in the contract
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notion that the courts should not have unlimited power to interfere with the
contractual relationships of private parties. 162 The Alcoa court rejected the
maxim as inappropriate in the price formula situation, 163 and it noted several
policy considerations that lent the remedy support: (1) there is a general trend
in the law to be responsive to commercial practices and understandings, 164
(2) there is a need to protect the viability of long-term price contracts,16 5 (3)
there is a need to protect the purposes of parties who actively seek to limit
their risks, 166 and (4) there is a need to develop an "appropriate legal response
to problems of inflation." 1 67 Whether these or other policy considerations
justify equitable adjustment of basic contract terms is likely to be the sub-
ject of much dispute among the courts and legal scholars. 168
If other courts follow Alcoa's lead on the adjustment remedy, a second
question will arise: whether the availability of this remedy justifies a
relaxation of the standards presently applied to the doctrines of mutual
mistake of fact, commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose. The
latter two theories have especially strict standards.1 69 One commentator has
noted that the adjustment possibility arguably justifies a relaxation of the
commercial impracticability standards because it,
that excused performance if it became unduly harsh. See Farnsworth, Disputes Over
Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 862-68 (1968); note 153 supra. The
new Restatement has repudiated that theory and treats impracticability and frustra-
tion of purpose as an omitted case, i.e., the parties failed to agree on a term defin-
ing their rights and duties on the happening of the event causing impracticability
or frustration. The new Restatement allows the court to adjust the rights of the par-
ties by supplying a reasonable term to cover the omission. RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2), 204, 292(2) (1981). Mistake is treated in a similar
manner. Id. § 152(2). For an explanation of contract omissions, see generally Farn-
sworth, supra.
Even though the maxim that a court will not make a contract for the parties can-
not be taken literally, it still reflects the notion that the courts do not have unlimited
power to impose contract terms to which the parties never agreed. The true ques-
tion raised in Alcoa is whether adjustment of basic terms in long-term executory con-
tracts exceeds the level of power that courts should have in resolving contract
disputes. The problem of defining the courts' power to adjust terms will become
even more acute if court-modified contracts are specifically enforced. See notes 177
& 199 infra.
162. See note 161 supra.
163. Aluminum Co. of Americav. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 91-92
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
164. Id. at 89.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 90.
167. Id. at 92.
168. See note 161 supra.
169. See pp. 83-95 supra.
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by splitting the losses, takes at least some of the sting out of the con-
clusion that excuse should be recognized. Since the losses will not
all fall entirely on one party or the other, the courts should be will-
ing to recognize excuse defenses more often, and then use the ad-
justment approach to apportion the losses. 170
Undoubtedly, advocates of certainty will object to any expansion of these
doctrines. 171 There is a good argument, however, that the benefits of cer-
tainty are outweighed by the benefits of more flexible doctrines that can be
used to protect the "purposes and expectations of the parties."1 72
A third question raised by the availability of equitable adjustment is what
kind of situations justify an adjustment of the price or other basic terms 73
of a contract. The Alcoa court stated:
[F]our factors considered in this decision will likely prove to be of
durable importance in deciding whether to modify contracts: (1) the
parties' prevision of the problems which eventually upset the balance
of the agreements and their allocation of the associated risks; (2) the
parties' attempts at risk limitation; (3) the existence of severe out
of pocket losses and (4) the customs and expectations of the particular
business community.174
The Uniform Commercial Code and the Second Restatement suggest that
equitable adjustment should be used only as a last resort.175 It stands to reason
that the courts will follow this approach. The courts probably will use the
remedy only when the normal application of the underlying theories coupled
with the normal "excuse or no excuse" solution are found inadequate to
provide a fair solution. Practical considerations also will be important in
deciding whether to use equitable adjustment. Unless a party seeking ad-
justment is able to convince the court that a fair adjustment can be deter-
170. Wallach, supra note 8, at 229.
171. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra. See also note 160 supra.
172. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 80
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
173. U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 6 would seem to allow equitable adjustment
of any term in a contract. At least one writer has suggested that price adjustment
was what the draftsman of the Code primarily had in mind. See Wallach, supra note
8, at 228. No such suggestion appears in the language of the new Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 158, 172 (1981).
174. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 92
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
175. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158, Comment c
(1981), which states:
Ordinarily the rules stated in this Chapter, coupled with those stated in
Chapter 16, will be adequate to allow the court to arrive at ajust result
.... If, however, these rules will not suffice to avoid injustice, the court
may supply a term just as it may in cases of impracticability of performance
and frustration of purpose.
See also notes 152 & 153 supra.
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mined with reasonable certainty, it is unlikely that the court will consider
adjustment a preferable alternative. 176 This would be true especially if specific
performance of the executory portion of the contract as modified is being
considered. 1"7
A fourth question raised by the availability of equitable adjustment is
what methods will be used to adjust the rights of the parties fairly. In Alcoa,
the price was set at the point where Alcoa was required to bear only those
losses attributable to risks it had assumed. 178 All other future losses (cost in-
creases) were shifted to Essex. 179 This was true, even though the losses pro-
bably were not attributable to risks, e.g., an inadequate price formula,
assumed or otherwise allocable under normal standards to Essex.18 0 Ap-
parently, the court decided that such an adjustment was fair to both parties. 181
In most cases it will be unfair to force the promisee to bear all of the loss
that is not readily allocable to the promisor under usual standards. 182 Be-
176. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 229.
177. Traditionally, the courts have not granted specific performance if the con-
tract terms are not certain enough to permit them to frame a proper remedy. See
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES§ 2.5 (1973). Proof of consequential damages also requires
reasonable certainty. Id. § 12.3. The courts probably will require certainty of fairness
before they will specifically enforce a contract with a court-imposed price term.
178. See notes 157-59 and accompanying text supra.
179. The court shifted some of the losses Alcoa would have suffered in the future
but for the adjustment. The adjustment requires Essex to pay Alcoa for cost in-
creases not attributable to risks assumed by Alcoa in the contract. Aluminum Co.
of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 78-80 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
180. The Alcoa court never clearly indicated whether it considered these risks
allocable to Essex. The court indicated that the adjustment would "preserve the
purposes and expectations of the parties." Id. at 79. The court also stated that the
adjustment would "reduce ALCOA's disappointment to the limit of risk the par-
ties expected in making the contract." Id. at 80. These statements could be inter-
preted to mean that the court thought Essex assumed the risk of these losses. The
court, however, also stated that the losses were "not adequately foreseen and pro-
vided for." Id. at 92. That statement suggests that the court thought the losses were
due to risks unallocable to either party. See also id. at 66-70.
181. The exact nature of the adjustment may be due to a settlement, but this
is unclear. The court did state:
During the trial the parties agreed that a modification of the price term
to require Essex to pay ALCOA the ceiling price specified in the contract
would be an appropriate remedy if the Court held for ALCOA. The Court
understands from the parties that ALCOA will continue to suffer a substan-
tial but smaller out of pocket loss at this price level.
Id. at 79. The meaning of this statement is unclear, but the opinion does indicate
that Essex opposed adjustment of the price. See id. at 78-80, 89-93.
182. InAlcoa, Essex still had a beneficial agreement after the price was adjusted.
In other cases, a complete shift of the otherwise unallocable losses might be burden-
some to the promisee.
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tween the extremes, however, it will be difficult to decide what standards
to apply to apportion such losses.
One approach the courts might take is to attempt to isolate the causes
of each portion of the loss and then to allocate the risk of each cause to one
or the other party. Under this approach, each party would bear the portion
of loss attributable to risks allocable to him. Since 100 % of the loss will have
to be attributed to risks allocable to one or the other party, the courts would
be forced to expand the category of factors that can be taken into account
in the risk of allocation inquiry. 18 3 The present standards are inadequate
because the "excuse or no excuse" solution generally has required the courts
only to state in a conclusory manner that all of the losses should be allocated
to the promisor.1 8 4 This isolation approach might be attractive because it
can be used in the original decision of whether to grant relief. "S If the ap-
proach leads to the conclusion that one or the other party should bear most
of the losses, price adjustment is unnecessary.1 8 6 If it is determined that 50 %
183. Because of the general rule that promisors bear the risk of nonperformance,
the courts have not developed a sophisticated set of factors to allocate risks. In many
cases, either foreseeability or conscious ignorance of the risk has been treated as
an absolute indicator that the complaining party assumed the risk. See notes 50-65
& 120-29 and accompanying text supra. Many times, the courts have allocated all
of the risks to the complaining party with little or no analysis. See, e.g., Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 135 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody
Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. App., W.D.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
For various factors relating to risk allocation, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 158, Comments a-d (1981); id. § 262; id. § 281, Comments b, c;
6 A. CORBIN, supra note 41, §§ 1328, 1354; Patterson, TheApportionment of Business
Risk Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 336 (1924); Posner & Rosenfield,
supra note 67, at 83.
It generally has been assumed that our present risk allocation standards are in-
adequate to allocate all risks and that there are situations in which losses cannot
be allocated to either party. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338
F.2d 99, 111 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965); 3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 41, § 598 (1960); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 67, at 113-14; Comment,
supra note 144, at 1058-59. The courts would have to eliminate this sphere of unallo-
cable risks if the 100 % allocation approach is used. To do so, the courts might have
to examine subtle equities, such as remote fault, remote foreseeability, and financial
ability. The problem with using these concepts, however, is that they may always
be applied to allocate these risks to the promisor. If so, the outcome would be very
much as it is today: the promisor would be denied relief. See notes 79-86 & 104-09
and accompanying text supra.
184. See note 183 supra.
185. Some courts already are isolating the causes of loss in the impracticabil-
ity analysis. See Wallach, supra note 8, at 218-21; notes 174-79 and accompanying
text supra.
186. If the court decides that the promisor should bear most of the losses, he
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of the losses should be borne by each party, then the losses can be allocated
evenly. The problems inherent in attempting to isolate each cause of loss
and to allocate each risk related to those causes, however, cuts against the
adoption of this approach.1 8 7
A second possible approach is to assume that all risks cannot be allocated
specifically and that the loss attributable to unallocable risks can be appor-
tioned according to notions of fairness and equity. 18 8 Under this approach,
the loss attributable to unallocable risks might be apportioned evenly, 18 9 ac-
cording to benefits to be conferred, 190 or according to the parties' individual
ability to bear them. 191 This approach is more flexible than the first one,
but it may be an inadequate measuring device when a complex long-term
contract is involved. 192
No method adopted by the courts will eliminate uncertainty. 193 This
uncertainty presents a valid ground for objection to equitable adjustment,
and some courts will be reluctant to use the remedy for that reason. In some
situations, however, the present "excuse or no excuse" solution is not flex-
ible enough to do justice. 194 In those instances, an imprecise method of ad-
justment may be better than none at all.
V. CONCLUSION
The promisor seeking relief from a long-term contract that has become
burdensome because of increased cost of performance has several avenues
to relief. Such disputes ordinarily are decided on the basis of commercial
will lose on the mistake, impracticability, or frustration issues. See generally notes
47-73 & 120-33 and accompanying text supra. If it is decided that the promisee should
bear most of the losses, the court should shift the entire loss to him by granting full
excuse. See notes 173-77 and accompanying text supra.
187. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 112 (Ct.
C1. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
188. See 338 F.2d at 112.
189. See id.; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 67, at 113-14; Comment, supra
note 144, at 1058-59.
190. The problem with setting the price at the level of benefits conferred is that
if the benefit is measured by market value, most of the loss will be shifted to the
promisee. If the product is unavailable on the market, the promisee will still prefer
this result instead of complete excuse for the promisor. In most situations, however,
the promisor will have assumed some risk and will be precluded from getting full
market price. See notes 178 & 179 and accompanying text supra.
191. In most situations, it would make little sense to impose a remedy with
which a party is financially unable to comply. This would be true especially if the
contract as modified were to be specifically enforced. SeeD. DOBBS, supra note 177,
at 63.
192. See notes 176 & 177 and accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 69 & 70 and accompanying text supra.
194. See notes 145-59 and accompanying text supra.
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impracticabilty. That theory, however, presents several strong barriers to
relief, and promisors generally have been unsuccessful. The promisor will
have a better chance of gaining relief if he can convince the court to adopt
Alcoa's more flexible application of the commercial impracticability doctrine.
But most courts probably will continue their past practice of applying a strict
approach.
Based on Alcoa, a promisor might consider asserting the frustration of
purpose doctrine. If it is only his purpose to earn money or avoid loss that
is frustrated, most courts will find the frustration doctrine inapplicable. In
that instance, commercial impracticability appears to be the proper theory.
Since most courts appear to use the same strict standards for both commer-
cial impracticability and frustration of purpose, the promisor has little to
gain, even if the court holds such purposes to be within the "scope of the
frustration doctrine.
The promisor also might assert the mutual mistake of fact doctrine as
a basis for relief. Whereas commercial impracticability and frustration of
purpose generally are triggered by supervening events, the mistake doctrine
applies to mistakes relating to facts existing at the time the contract was made.
The promisor, therefore, must first consider whether he can characterize
the cause of his losses as relating to an "existing fact." If so, the mistake
doctrine is a desirable theory because it does not require severe hardship
as a condition to relief.
Whatever theory the promisor asserts, he should consider asking for
equitable adjustment. The promisor still may end up with an undesirable
contract, but the court might be willing to grant him some relief if it has the
flexibility to avoid placing a heavy burden on the promisee. Courts will be
reluctant to grant equitable adjustment because it does not offer simple solu-
tions. In view of the flexibility offered by the remedy, however, a court would
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